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NORTH DAKOTA’S SEAT BELT DEFENSE: IT’S TIME FOR
NORTH DAKOTA TO STATUTORILY ADOPT THE DOCTRINE
OF AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES
ABSTRACT
In the context of tort law, the seat belt defense is in its infancy. The
purpose of the defense is to allow a defendant in a personal injury claim to
admit evidence of the plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat belt. If the defendant
can adequately prove a causal relationship between the plaintiff’s failure to
wear a seat belt and the injuries alleged, the seat belt defense can be an
effective tool to reduce or wholly defeat a plaintiff’s recovery for damages.
This article argues the need for North Dakota to adopt the doctrine of
avoidable consequences with regard to the seat belt defense. The adoption
of this approach is the most equitable alternative to the seat belt defense.
Part II discusses an overview of comparative negligence theories and its
relationship to the seat belt defense’s origins. The three basic approaches to
the admissibility of the seat belt defense are discussed in Part III:
inadmissible, admissible only to mitigate damages (doctrine of avoidable
consequences), or admissible to prove comparative negligence. Part IV of
the article outlines the arguments for and against the adoption of the
doctrine of avoidable consequences and provides a proposal for North
Dakota to statutorily adopt the doctrine of avoidable consequences as it
pertains to the seat belt defense. Lastly, Part V restates the need for a
change in North Dakota’s current approach to the seat belt defense.
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INTRODUCTION

Rosemary Karczmit was fatally injured after her car hit a patch of ice,
left the roadway, and collided with a telephone post.1 Her husband brought
a wrongful death action against the State of New York, alleging the State’s
failure to maintain proper drains and guide rails were the proximate causes
of Rosemary’s death.2 In response, the State asserted Rosemary’s injuries,
which resulted in her death, would not have been caused but-for her failure
to wear a seat belt at the time of the accident.3 The court rendered a judgment in favor of Karczmit, but held Rosemary fifty percent at fault for
causing the accident.4 The court additionally held Rosemary failed to
mitigate her damages by failing to wear a seat belt.5 Therefore, Karczmit’s
judgment was reduced by an additional twenty-five percent.6
Under North Dakota’s current law, Karczmit’s recovery would have
been substantially different.7 Because Rosemary was fifty percent at fault
for causing the accident and her failure to wear a seat belt accounted for an
additional twenty-five percent of her damages, under North Dakota law, she
would have been deemed seventy-five percent at fault.8 Consequently,
Karczmit’s claim would have been completely barred under comparative
negligence, and he would have recovered nothing in the wrongful death
claim.9
The outcome of Karczmit was wholly dependent on how New York
admitted evidence of seat belt nonuse in personal injury claims. 10 The
admissibility of such evidence is known as the seat belt defense.11 In the
context of tort law, the seat belt defense is in its infancy.12 Rooted in the
adoption of comparative negligence, the seat belt defense predominantly

1. Karczmit v. State, 588 N.Y.S.2d 963, 964 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1992).
2. Id. Karczmit alleged the patch of ice was caused by a defective drainage system and the
car failed to stay on the road because of an inadequate guardrail system. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 972.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See discussion infra Part III.C (explaining North Dakota recognizes accident-causing fault
and injury-causing fault as the same thing).
8. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (2010) (combining accident-causing and
injury-causing fault).
9. See generally id. (barring claims where the plaintiff’s fault is as great as, or is greater than,
the defendant’s fault).
10. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1229-c(8) (Consol. 1992) (failing to wear a seat belt is
admissible to mitigate a plaintiff’s damages).
11. Dean Joseph Miller, Comment, The Seat Belt Defense Under Comparative Negligence,
12 IDAHO L. REV. 59, 59 n.1 (1975).
12. Id. at 59.
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came to the forefront of tort issues within the last four decades. 13 Although
most states have statutory enactments or judicial fiats concerning the admissibility of seat belt evidence, North Dakota has an unsettled history with
regard to the seat belt defense’s admissibility.14
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the need for North Dakota
to statutorily adopt the doctrine of avoidable consequences as it pertains to
the seat belt defense. Part II discusses an overview of comparative negligence and its relationship to the seat belt defense’s origins.15 The three
basic approaches to the admissibility of the seat belt defense are discussed
in Part III: inadmissible, admissible only to mitigate damages (doctrine of
avoidable consequences), or admissible to prove comparative negligence.16
Part IV of the article outlines the arguments for and against the adoption of
the doctrine of avoidable consequences and provides a proposal for North
Dakota to statutorily adopt the doctrine for the seat belt defense.17 Lastly,
Part V restates the need for a change in North Dakota’s current approach to
the seat belt defense.18
II. AN OVERVIEW OF NEGLIGENCE THEORIES AND THEIR
RELATIONSHIP TO THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE
The theory that contributory negligence completely bars a plaintiff’s
recovery in negligence actions arose in England in the early nineteenth
century.19 The United States first adjudicated the theory in 1824.20
Contributory negligence remained in effect for over a century but was
slowly phased out in favor of comparative fault.21 During the transition, the
issue of the seat belt defense came to the forefront of tort law.22 This
section will first discuss the United States’ shift from contributory
13. Id.
14. See discussion infra Parts III.A-D (discussing the three variations of admitting seat belt
evidence and North Dakota’s approach to the defense).
15. See discussion infra Part II.
16. See discussion infra Part III.
17. See discussion infra Part IV.
18. See discussion infra Part V.
19. David C. Sobelsohn, Comparing Fault, 60 IND. L.J. 413, 413 (1985).
20. Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621, 624 (1824) (holding a plaintiff’s failure to
exercise ordinary care should preclude the plaintiff from recovering damages); Sobelsohn, supra
note 19, at 413.
21. Sobelsohn, supra note 19, at 414. “Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
plaintiff . . . which is a legally contributing cause . . . [to] the plaintiff’s harm.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965). Comparative fault requires the fact finder to compare each
party’s negligence and reduce the plaintiff’s damages based on the comparison. MARSHALL S.
SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW 171 (2003).
22. David A. Westenberg, Buckle Up or Pay: The Emerging Safety Belt Defense, 20
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 867, 870 (1986).
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negligence to comparative negligence and its impact on personal injury
litigation.23 Then, this section will discuss the origins of the seat belt
defense in light of the negligence doctrines.24 Lastly, the relationship
between the negligence theories and the seat belt defense will be
analyzed.25
A. SHIFT FROM CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Comparative negligence is a relatively new concept in American tort
It was not until the 1970s when states began to steer away from
contributory negligence to the more lenient theory of comparative negligence.27 The shift was in response to the apparent lack of justification for
contributory negligence and the harshness of completely barring recovery
for the plaintiff, no matter how slight the plaintiff’s “lack of ordinary care”
may be.28
There are three general forms of comparative negligence: “pure”
comparative negligence and two forms of “modified” comparative
negligence.29 “Pure” comparative negligence is the simplest form of comparative negligence, which compensates a plaintiff for all harm attributable
to the tortfeasor, but reduces the plaintiff’s damages in proportion to his/her
own negligence.30 “Pure” comparative negligence will not bar recovery
unless the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages is wholly attributable
to the plaintiff.31 Congress adopted the “pure” form of comparative
negligence with the enactment of the Federal Employers Liability Act in
1908.32 Two years later, Mississippi became the first state to statutorily
adopt the theory of pure comparative negligence for all negligence cases.33
Now, thirteen states throughout the United States have statutorily or judicially adopted the “pure” form of comparative negligence.34
law.26

23. See discussion infra Part II.A.
24. See discussion infra Part II.B.
25. See discussion infra Part II.C.
26. Miller, supra note 11, at 62.
27. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 471 (5th ed. 1984).
28. Miller, supra note 11, at 59. A plaintiff’s claim was barred if he/she was found to be one
percent or more at fault. Id.
29. KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, at 471.
30. Id. If the plaintiff is awarded a $100,000.00 judgment but is eighty-five percent at fault,
he can only recover $15,000.00.
31. 21 AM. JUR. Trials § 3 (1974).
32. Id. § 4.
33. Id.
34. Arthur Best, Impediments to Reasonable Tort Reform: Lessons from the Adoption of
Comparative Negligence, 40 IND. L. REV. 1, 17, app. (2007); see also ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.060
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The second and third types of comparative negligence are considered
“modified” forms of comparative negligence.35 The first approach, or the
“equal fault bar” approach, allows a plaintiff to recover as long as his/her
negligence is less than that of the defendant.36 Wisconsin and Arkansas
were the first states to adopt this approach to comparative negligence.37
The other “modified” form of comparative negligence is the “greater fault
bar,” which allows the plaintiff to recover damages so long as his/her fault
does not exceed that of the defendant.38 In 1969, New Hampshire became
the first state to adopt the “greater fault bar” form of modified comparative
negligence.39
B. THE ORIGINS OF THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE
As the American court systems shifted from contributory negligence to
comparative negligence, some state legislatures implemented statutes mandating the installation of seat belts in all newly modeled automobiles.40 In
conjunction with the requirement to install seat belts, five states judicially
adopted the seat belt defense in civil litigation cases.41 In the 1966 Sams v.

(2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2505 (LexisNexis 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572o
(West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182
(LexisNexis 2005); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §
600.2957(1) (LexisNexis 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.765
(West 2008); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1411 (Consol. 2001); R.I. GEN LAWS § 9-20-4 (1997); Li v. Yellow
Cab, Co. 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975); Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 1242 (N.M. 1981).
35. Best, supra note 34, at 17.
36. Id. A plaintiff will recover if he/she is found to be forty-nine percent or less at fault for
the damages. Id.
37. AM. JUR., supra note 31, § 3. Several other states followed Wisconsin and Arkansas
thereafter. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1985); 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1116 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-2-6 (LexisNexis 2008);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3 (West 1998); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (LexisNexis 2000);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (2009); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 41.141 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d (LexisNexis 2009);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.33 (LexisNexis 2010);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18.470 (2003); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 7102(a) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-15 (2005); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (West 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (2002); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (West 1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 2006); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 1-1-109 (2011).
38. AM. JUR., supra note 31, § 3. The plaintiff will recover if he/she is fifty percent or less at
fault than the defendant. Id.
39. See id. § 4. Several states followed New Hampshire’s example. See ARK. CODE ANN. §
16-64-122 (Supp. 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-11-7
(2000); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-801 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (Supp. 2010); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. §
78B-5-818 (LexisNexis 2008); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tenn. 1992); Bradley v.
Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 885 (W. Va. 1979).
40. Westenberg, supra note 22, at 874.
41. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 42-56.
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Sams42 case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina became the first court to
recognize the merits of the seat belt defense.43 The basis for admitting evidence of seat belt nonuse rested on the belief that the plaintiff’s failure to
wear his seat belt “amounted to a failure to exercise such due care as a
person of ordinary reason and prudence would have exercised under the
same circumstances, and that such failure constituted a contributing
proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.”44
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin faced the question of the admissibility of seat belt nonuse a year later in Bentzler v. Braun.45 Bentzler was
injured in a rear-end collision when she was thrown from her seat and
pinned in the wreckage.46 At the time of the accident, Benztler was asleep
and not wearing her seat belt.47 The trial court determined Bentzler’s
failure to wear an available seat belt was negligent, but did not cause her
injuries.48 On appeal, Braun argued Bentzler’s negligence was the cause of
her injuries and the jury should have been given a special verdict form
regarding Bentzler’s negligence by failing to use a seat belt.49 Wisconsin’s
supreme court determined the failure to use an available seat belt could not
be negligence per se without a statute mandating the use of seat belts, but
rather invoked the common law standard of ordinary care.50 Therefore, if
evidence indicated a causal relationship between the plaintiff’s failure to
use a seat belt and his/her injuries, a jury instruction would be proper and
necessary.51 One year later, the Appellate Court of Illinois adopted the
causal relationship standard in Mount v. McClellan.52
The most prominent adoption of the seat belt defense came in Spier v.
Barker,53 which is now regarded as the modern version of the defense.54
The New York Court of Appeals determined “the plaintiff’s nonuse of an
available seat belt should be strictly limited to the jury’s determination of

42. 148 S.E.2d 154 (S.C. 1966).
43. Sams, 148 S.E.2d at 155.
44. Id. The California Court of Appeals adopted the same standard in Truman v. Vargas, 80
Cal. Rptr. 373 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1969).
45. 149 N.W.2d 626 (Wis. 1967).
46. Bentzler, 149 N.W.2d at 630.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 638.
50. Id. at 639.
51. Id. at 640.
52. 234 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed Mount
seventeen years later. Clarkson v. Wright, 483 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ill. 1985) (rejecting the seat belt
defense).
53. 323 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 1974).
54. Westenberg, supra note 22, at 874.
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the plaintiff’s damages and should not be considered by the triers of fact in
resolving the issue of liability.”55 However, the court further concluded the
issue of mitigating damages should only be given to the jury after the defendant demonstrates, by “competent evidence,” a causal relationship between
the injuries, or damages, sustained and the plaintiff’s failure to use a seat
belt.56
As courts began adopting the seat belt defense as an affirmative
defense in civil negligence cases, state legislatures began pushing for laws
mandating seat belt use.57 The push for such laws derived from the
increased social and economic loss incurred by auto accidents.58 In
response to demands, Congress passed the Federal Aid Highway Act of
1973, which allowed Congress to increase state highway funds by twentyfive percent if states passed mandatory seat belt use laws.59 Additionally,
on July 17, 1984, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) enacted Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208,
requiring the mandatory installation of seat belts in all vehicles.60
In addition to requiring the installation of seat belts, the federal
standard required a provision suggesting the admissibility of seat belt
evidence.61 The provision stated, in relevant part, any plaintiff violating the
seat belt requirement would mitigate his/her damages if the plaintiff sought
compensation for injuries arising from the accident.62 Although states
began mandating the installation of seat belts, a majority of states failed to
adopt the “mitigation” provision.63 However, the minority of states
adopting the “mitigation” provision did so with substantial modifications.64

55. Spier, 323 N.E.2d at 167.
56. Id.
57. Michael B. Gallub, Note, A Compromise Between Mitigation and Comparative Fault?: A
Critical Assessment of the Seat Belt Controversy and a Proposal for Reform, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV.
319, 319 (1986).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 334-35 n.79 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 S4.1.5.2(c)(2) (1985)).
61. Id.
62. See id. “Mitigate” was to refer to either the mitigating damages approach or any other
approach which would reduce the plaintiff’s award. Id. at 335 n.80. The NHTSA’s approach
included comparative fault. Id.
63. Id.
64. See discussion infra Parts III.B-C.
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C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEGLIGENCE THEORIES
AND THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE
The strength of the seat belt defense correlates with the American court
system’s adoption of comparative negligence.65 Prior to the adoption of
comparative negligence, the seat belt defense had been unanimously
rejected.66 Contributory negligence had the ability to bar a claim if the
plaintiff was one percent at fault, which made courts unwilling to completely bar a plaintiff’s recovery for failing to wear a seat belt.67 Courts
have unanimously rejected the assertion that failing to wear a mandatory
seat belt is negligence per se because it would also completely bar a
plaintiff’s recovery.68
However, under the newly accepted comparative negligence laws, the
failure to wear a seat belt may or may not completely bar a plaintiff’s
recovery.69 Under the “pure” form of comparative negligence, a plaintiff’s
damages can be reduced up to ninety-nine percent.70 Nevertheless, under
either form of “modified” comparative negligence, there is a possibility the
plaintiff’s claim will be completely barred because of his/her failure to wear
a seat belt.71
III. THE APPLICATION OF THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE
There are three distinct ways in which a state can admit the seat belt
defense.72 A majority of states have determined seat belt evidence is not
admissible for any purpose in the adjudication process of civil litigation
65. See discussion infra Part II.C.
66. Miller, supra note 11, at 64. Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the
District of Columbia still adhere to the principle of contributory negligence and, therefore, do not
admit evidence of seat belt nonuse. See Westenberg, supra note 22, at 944, app. D; see also MD.
CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 22-412.3(h)(1)(i)-(ii) (LexisNexis 2009) (stating evidence in violation of
the mandatory seat belt law may not be considered for negligence or contributory negligence);
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1094(D) (2005) (stating evidence of seat belt nonuse shall not constitute
negligence and is not admissible); Britton v. Doehring, 242 So. 2d 666, 671 (Ala. 1970) (holding
seat belt evidence is inadmissible to show contributory negligence on behalf of the plaintiff);
McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720, 722 (D.C. 1976) (determining seat belt nonuse cannot be
considered evidence of contributory negligence); Miller v. Miller, 160 S.E.2d 65, 74 (N.C. 1968)
(holding a plaintiff cannot foreseeably anticipate another’s negligence and, therefore, seat belt
evidence is generally inadmissible to show contributory negligence).
67. John A. Hoglund & A. Peter Parsons, Caveat Viator: The Duty to Wear Seat Belts Under
Comparative Negligence Law, 50 WASH. L. REV. 1, 9 (1974).
68. Id.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 70-71.
70. KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, at 471-72. Therefore, as long as the plaintiff’s failure to
wear a seat belt is not the only cause of his/her injuries, the plaintiff will recover.
71. Id. at 473. If the plaintiff is found to be fifty or fifty-one percent liable for his/her
damages, the claim is completely barred. Id.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 73-75.
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claims.73 Another alternative, and perhaps the most diverse alternative, is
the theory that a plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat belt is a failure by the
plaintiff to mitigate his/her damages.74 Lastly, some states allow evidence
of seat belt nonuse to show comparative fault.75 North Dakota has not
taken a firm stance on the issue, but is among the minority of states that
allow evidence of seat belt nonuse to be admitted as evidence of comparative negligence.76
A. EVIDENCE OF SEAT BELT NONUSE IS NOT ADMISSIBLE
The majority of states do not allow the seat belt defense in any
fashion.77 Traditionally, states were unwilling to admit seat belt evidence to
show fault under contributory negligence based on its ability to wholly
defeat a plaintiff’s claim.78 Scholars believed the shift from contributory
negligence to comparative fault would lead to the adoption of the seat belt
defense.79 However, in light of the doctrine of comparative fault, states still
embrace the defense’s inadmissibility.80 This part of the article will discuss
states within the Eighth Circuit that do not allow the seat belt defense to be
admitted in personal injury proceedings.81
1.

Minnesota

Minnesota is one of two states within the Eighth Circuit and one of
thirty states within the United States that does not permit the seat belt
defense to be used in any personal injury claim.82 Minnesota has taken a
firm stance on applying the seat belt gag rule,83 precluding evidence of seat
belt nonuse from all personal injury claims arising out of motor vehicle

73. Westenberg, supra note 22, at 887-88.
74. Gallub, supra note 57, at 322-23; see also discussion infra Part III.B.
75. See discussion infra Part III.C.
76. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (2010) (combining accident-causing fault and injurycausing fault for purposes of demonstrating comparative fault).
77. Westenberg, supra note 22, at 887-88; see also infra Appendix A.
78. Miller, supra note 11, at 66. Contributory negligence would bar a plaintiff’s claim if the
plaintiff was found to be at least one percent at fault. KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, at 471.
79. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 67, at 14-15.
80. See discussion infra Parts III.A.1-2.
81. See discussion infra Parts III.A.1-2.
82. See infra Appendix A; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.685(4)(a) (Supp. 2011) (stating
“proof of the use or failure to use seat belts . . . or proof of the installation or failure of installation
of seat belts . . . shall not be admissible in evidence in any litigation involving personal injuries or
property damages resulting from the use or operation of any motor vehicle”).
83. “Minnesota Statute section 169.685(4)(a) has commonly been referred to as the seat belt
gag rule.” Carlson v. Hyundai Motor Co., 164 F.3d 1160, 1161 (8th Cir. 1999).
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collisions.84 The intent behind disallowing such evidence is to “remove
from the jury’s consideration the use or nonuse of a seat belt” when
considering damages.85
Cressy v. Grassmann86 challenged the constitutionality of the seat belt
gag rule. The appellants argued differentiating between defendants, based
on which traffic law the plaintiff violated, was unconstitutional.87 The
Minnesota Court of Appeals did not find merit in the argument based on the
relationship between the accident and its proximate cause.88 The court
stated violation of the seat belt statute generally does not cause the accident,
but it rather relates to the extent of damages.89 The court determined
creating classes of plaintiffs based on those who cause an accident and
those who failed to mitigate his/her own damages sufficed the different
treatment prong of the equal protection clause.90 The second and third
prongs were satisfied if the state’s directive served a particular class of
people and a legitimate state interest, respectively.91 The court in Cressy
opined ensuring accident victims were fairly compensated served a
particular class of people—accident victims.92 Furthermore, providing the
opportunity for accident victims to recoup losses served a legitimate state
interest.93 The court in Cressy also opined the enactment of mandatory seat
belt laws and comparative fault statutes did not repeal the seat belt
defense.94
2.

South Dakota

In 1994, South Dakota mandated the use of seat belts for passengers in
the front seat of a vehicle,95 the same year the legislature adopted the seat
belt gag rule.96 The gag rule provided, among other things, that the failure
to use a seat belt may not be used in “any civil litigation on issues of

84. Id. at 1161-62 (failing to use a seat belt or proof of failure to installation a seat belt is
inadmissible evidence in any suit involving personal injuries arising out of the use of a motor
vehicle or in crashworthiness claims alleging a defect in the seat belt system).
85. Lind v. Slowinski, 450 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
86. 536 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
87. Cressy, 536 N.W.2d at 42 (differentiating between plaintiffs who violated the seat belt
law and any other traffic violation).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 43.
95. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-38-1 (2004) (indicating the mandate for use of seat belts).
96. See id. § 32-38-4.
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injuries or mitigating damages.”97 The statute further states that failing to
comply with the mandatory seat belt law does “not constitute contributory
negligence, comparative negligence, or an assumption of risk.”98
In 1993, one year prior to the effective date of South Dakota Codified
Laws section 32-38-4, forbidding the admissibility of seat belt nonuse in
civil litigation claims, Jeffrey Davis was involved in a two-car accident
with Susan Knippling.99 As a result of the accident, Davis, who was not
wearing a seat belt, suffered multiple injuries.100 At trial, the defense was
allowed to admit evidence of Davis’s seat belt nonuse to show he failed to
avoid or minimize his damages.101 The court recognized the newly enacted
section 32-38-4 controlled the issue for future cases, but decided the issue
for the limited purpose of the case at hand.102
The South Dakota Supreme Court ruled consistent with the newly
enacted statute, holding a plaintiff’s failure to wear an available seat belt
should not be admissible in civil litigation claims.103 The court reasoned
such admissibility was inconsistent with the traditional view of the mitigation doctrine.104 Furthermore, the court desired to stay in line with a
majority of states judicially declining to admit seat belt nonuse to show a
plaintiff’s failure to mitigate his/her damages.105
B. EVIDENCE OF SEAT BELT NONUSE IS ADMISSIBLE
TO MITIGATE DAMAGES
There are a number of states that have adopted an alternative approach
to admitting the seat belt defense.106 These states allow the seat belt
defense to be admitted only to show the plaintiff failed to mitigate his/her
damages.107 The theory is known as the doctrine of avoidable consequences.108 There are a variety of ways in which states apply the

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Davis v. Knippling, 576 N.W.2d 525, 526, 528 (S.D. 1998).
100. Id. at 526.
101. Id. at 528.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 529.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Gallub, supra note 57, at 322-23.
107. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 67, at 18-19. The jury is instructed to determine the
percentage of damages which were attributable to the plaintiff’s negligence. Id. at 19 n.69. After
allocation of comparative fault has been established, the plaintiff’s damages are then reduced by a
percentage of “mitigating damages.” Id. at 19.
108. Miller, supra note 11, at 70.
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doctrine.109 However, it is consistent among states allowing the seat belt
defense that a causal relationship must be shown between the failure to
wear a seat belt and the resulting injuries.110 This part of the article
discusses two approaches to the doctrine of avoidable consequences.111
1.

Iowa, Nebraska, and Missouri

Three states within the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Iowa,
Nebraska, and Missouri, are among the minority of states that allow the seat
belt defense for purposes of demonstrating the plaintiff’s failure to mitigate
his/her damages.112 States that have adopted the doctrine of avoidable consequences approach acknowledge the seat belt defense’s applicability, but
limit its scope by placing a percentage cap on the extent to which the
plaintiff’s recovery may be reduced.113 Therefore, after the fact finder has
determined the allocation of fault between the parties, the fact finder then
reduces the plaintiff’s damage recovery by the percentage attributed to the
failure to wear a seat belt.114 The additional reduction is not factored into
the comparative fault analysis for purposes of recovery.115
Throughout the United States, the percentage cap is held between no
more than a one percent reduction up to no more than a fifteen percent
reduction.116 Iowa and Nebraska are among several states that allow the
seat belt defense to attribute up to five percent for the plaintiff’s failure to
mitigate damages.117 However, Missouri is the most lenient state, capping
the reduction at no more than one percent.118

109. See Jesse N. Bomer, Comment, The Seatbelt Defense: A Doctrine Based in Common
Sense, 38 TULSA L. REV. 405, 420-24 (2002).
110. Gallub, supra note 57, at 322-23. “[T]he defendant bears the burden of proving, by use
of expert testimony, which injuries, if any, the plaintiff could have avoided through use of a
seatbelt.” Id. at 322.
111. Alternative approaches not discussed include the reduction for pain and suffering only.
See infra appendix A (referencing Colorado’s statute allowing reduction for pain and suffering).
112. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445(4)(b) (West 1997 & Supp. 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. §
307.178(4) (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-6,273 (2004).
113. Bomer, supra note 109, at 422.
114. KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, at 345.
115. For example, if a person is forty-five percent at fault and his failure to wear a seat belt
attributes to five percent of his injuries, he can still recover under a modified comparative fault
structure because the two percentages are independent of one another and are applied
consecutively, not concurrently.
116. Bomer, supra note 109, at 422-23; see infra Appendix A.
117. IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445(4); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-6,273.
118. MO. ANN. STAT. § 307.178(4) (West 2009).
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New York

Although New York is the only state that applies an unrestricted mitigating damages approach, the unrestricted mitigation approach is said to be
the modern trend for the seat belt defense.119 Prior to the codification of the
mitigation of damages approach, the New York Court of Appeals faced the
question of how to admit seat belt use evidence in a civil litigation claim. 120
The court recognized three different approaches to admitting the seat belt
defense.121 The first approach held the plaintiff’s failure to use a seat belt
as negligence per se.122 However, the court rejected the approach on the
basis that New York did not require an automobile occupant to use an available seat belt at the time the accident occurred.123
The court also rejected the second approach: the doctrine of contributory negligence.124 The theory of contributory negligence is only
applicable “if the plaintiff’s failure to exercise due care causes, in whole or
in part, the accident,” and the court determined failing to use a seat belt
rarely, if ever, causes an accident.125 The New York Court of Appeals,
therefore, adopted a modification of the third approach: the plaintiff cannot
recover for injuries sustained if the plaintiff acted with disregard to his/her
best interest.126
The Spier court held the doctrine of avoidable consequences to be the
most equitable approach to the seat belt defense.127 Although wearing a
seat belt is a pre-accident obligation and the doctrine of avoidable consequences generally deals with post-accident conduct, the act of fastening a
seat belt is “an unusual and ordinarily unavailable” means by which a
plaintiff can minimize his/her damages prior to the accident.128 New York
codified the doctrine of avoidable consequences approach following the
decision in Spier.129

119. Westenberg, supra note 22, at 874; see also Bomer, supra note 109, at 421.
120. Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164, 165-66 (N.Y. 1974).
121. Id. at 167.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 167-68.
125. Id. at 168. The court felt it improper to impose liability on a plaintiff for all of his/her
injuries, if the seat belt would have prevented only some or none of the injuries. Id.
126. Id. at 167.
127. Id. at 168.
128. Id.
129. Bomer, supra note 109, at 412. The avoidable consequences approach allows the jury
to reduce a plaintiff’s damage recovery by any amount without barring the plaintiff’s claim.
Spier, 332 N.E.2d at 167.
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C. EVIDENCE OF SEAT BELT NONUSE IS ADMISSIBLE TO
PROVE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
A minority of states allow the seat belt defense to show comparative
fault.130 These jurisdictions generally acknowledge failing to wear a seat
belt in violation of mandatory seat belt laws is not negligence per se, but
they recognize the defense’s ability to show comparative fault.131 This
section discusses the comparative fault approach to the seat belt defense
throughout the United States.132
1.

Florida

Florida is one of three states whose legislature has adopted the seat belt
defense as a means for showing comparative fault.133 In 1986, Florida
passed the Florida Safety Belt Law, mandating the use of seat belts in the
front seat of automobiles.134 In addition to mandating the use of seat belts,
the provision provided that a violation of the mandatory seat belt law was
not prima facie evidence of negligence or negligence per se.135 However,
the statutory language created ambiguity in determining whether seat belt
use should be considered for purposes of contributory negligence or mitigating damages.136 Therefore, in 1990, the Florida Legislature amended the
statute to explicitly state a violation of the mandatory seat belt statute may
be considered as comparative negligence, not negligence, negligence per se,
or in consideration for mitigation of damages.137 The change was adopted
to create consistency and clarity within the judicial system.138

130. See infra appendix A; see also CAL. VEH. CODE § 27315(i) (Deering Supp. 2011); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 316.614(10) (West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 257.710e(7) (LexisNexis
2010) (reducing recovery of damages only up to five percent); Law v. Superior Court, 755 P.2d
1135, 1145 (Ariz. 1988); Wemyss v. Coleman, 729 S.W.2d 174, 179 (Ky. 1987); Dunn v. Durso,
530 A.2d 387, 397 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986); Day v. Gen. Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349,
357 (N.D. 1984). North Dakota is the only other state within the Eighth Circuit allowing evidence
of seat belt nonuse to be used for comparative fault. See infra Appendix A.
131. See discussion infra Part III.C.
132. See discussion infra Part III.C.
133. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.614(10); see also CAL. VEH. CODE § 27315(i); MICH. COMP.
LAWS SERV. § 257.710e(7).
134. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.614 (stating the driver of the vehicle and any front seat
passenger over the age of sixteen must wear a seat belt); Ridley v. Safety Kleen Corp., 693 So. 2d
934, 940 (Fla. 1996).
135. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.614.
136. Ridley, 693 So. 2d at 940.
137. Id. at 940-41.
138. Id. at 941.
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New Jersey

Although a few states have legislatively adopted the seat belt defense
as a means for showing comparative fault, other states have judicially
adopted the approach.139 In Dunn v. Durso,140 the Superior Court of New
Jersey recognized a plaintiff’s “common-law duty to wear an available seat
belt.”141 Although New Jersey did not mandate the use of seat belts at the
time, the court opined a plaintiff’s passive negligence should hold the
plaintiff culpable.142 A plaintiff’s passive negligence rests in his/her duty to
avoid an unreasonable risk of harm to one’s self.143 The court went on to
say it is fundamental in the theory of negligence for one to “exercise the
standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would pursue under
similar circumstances in protecting himself from harm.”144 Thus, with the
availability and demonstrated effectiveness of seat belts, it is the plaintiff’s
duty to avoid unreasonable harm by failing to utilize a seat belt.145
D. NORTH DAKOTA’S CURRENT APPROACH
North Dakota is among the minority of states that fail to recognize the
seat belt defense within its mandatory seat belt laws.146 Instead, North
Dakota’s seat belt laws must be read in conjunction with its comparative
fault statutes to determine the admissibility of seat belt evidence. 147 North
Dakota Century Code section 39-21-41.4 states a person’s failure to wear a
seat belt should not be admitted for purposes of proving negligence.148
However, North Dakota’s comparative fault statute recognizes if the
plaintiff is at fault, his/her damages should be reduced in proportion to such
fault.149

139. See Wemyss v. Coleman, 729 S.W.2d 174, 179 (Ky. 1987); Dunn v. Durso, 530 A.2d
387, 397 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986); see also infra Appendix A (listing the states judicially
adopting the approach).
140. 530 A.2d 387 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986).
141. Dunn, 530 A.2d at 395.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 396.
145. Id. at 396-97.
146. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-21-41.4 (2008); see also infra Appendix A (comparing other
state statutes).
147. See supra discussion accompanying notes 130-31.
148. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-21-41.4.
149. See id. § 32-03.2-02 (2010). As long as the plaintiff’s fault is not as great as the
combined fault of all other persons contributing to the injury, the plaintiff’s claim shall not be
barred. Id.
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Day v. General Motors Corp.150 explained the theory of admitting seat
belt evidence as it pertains to fault.151 Day was involved in a one-vehicle
accident after he fell asleep at the wheel and struck a culvert, causing his
vehicle to rollover and subsequently caused him to be ejected from the
vehicle through the doorframe.152 Day admitted he was at fault for causing
the accident because he fell asleep at the wheel, but contended his injuries
would not have been sustained had General Motors not defectively
designed the door latching system.153
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined all fault was to be
analogous with causal negligence.154 The court ultimately determined
where the plaintiff’s percentage of fault is relevant, both accident-producing
fault and injury-enhancing fault should be considered together, so as to
reduce or defeat the plaintiff’s recovery.155 Although Day involved strict
liability, as noted in Justice Gierke’s concurrence, the language in the
majority opinion blurred the distinction between strict liability cases and
common negligence cases.156 The ambiguity in the majority opinion
implied accident-causing fault and injury-enhancing fault should be viewed
concurrently when determining fault for purposes of reducing or defeating a
plaintiff’s claim.157
To further blur the distinction between strict liability cases and
common negligence cases, a proposed jury instruction highlights the
opinion in Day.158 It states: “The law makes no distinction between
accident-causing fault and injury-causing fault. If you find fault, you must
allocate the fault on a percentage basis between all persons legally responsible for such fault . . . .”159 Although patterned jury instructions are not
mandatory, they must follow the law of the state.160 Therefore, if the
defense can adequately show a causal relationship between the plaintiff’s
injuries and his/her failure to wear a seat belt, then such evidence can be
admitted to show comparative fault.161

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984).
Day, 345 N.W.2d at 351.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 351, 358
Id. at 358 (Gierke, J., concurring).
Id.
N.D.J.I. Civ. No. C-2.84 (2000).
Id.
City of Minot v. Rubbelke, 456 N.W.2d 511, 513 (N.D. 1990).
See discussion supra Part III.D.
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IV. IMPLEMENTING THE DOCTRINE OF AVOIDABLE
CONSEQUENCES
“America’s jurisdictions are both literally and figuratively all over the
map with regard to the seat belt defense.”162 As previously discussed, the
doctrine of avoidable consequences is the minority position states have
taken in admitting the seat belt defense.163 Moreover, it is the most
fractioned approach to admitting seat belt evidence.164 This part of the
article discusses the pros and cons of the doctrine of avoidable consequences.165 It also proposes an approach for adopting the doctrine and
implementing the mitigation of damages analysis in a special verdict
form.166
A. ARGUMENTS FOR ADOPTION OF THE DOCTRINE
The doctrine of avoidable consequences is the middle ground for
admitting seat belt evidence: evidence of the plaintiff’s seat belt nonuse is
admissible, but it cannot wholly defeat a plaintiff’s recovery.167 There are
two over-arching reasons the doctrine of avoidable consequences is an
appropriate method for applying the seat belt defense.168 The first argument
stems from the cause of the accident.169 Generally, a person’s failure to
wear his/her seat belt does not cause the accident.170 Focusing on the cause
of the accident creates distinction between active and passive negligence.171
Active negligence is a negligent act that causes the initial accident, whereas
passive negligence is a negligent act that enhances the person’s injuries.172
However, for passive negligence to be operational, the conduct must be
“unreasonable.”173 Generally, “only risks which are recognizable or foreseeable are unreasonable. In the absence of negligent conduct which would
alert the plaintiff to the possibility of the accident there is no foreseeable

162. Bomer, supra note 109, at 424 (emphasis omitted).
163. See discussion supra Part III.B.
164. Bomer, supra note 109, at 70.
165. See discussion infra Parts IV.A-B.
166. See discussion infra Part IV.C. (specifically discussing how North Dakota should
implement the adoption of the doctrine of avoidable consequences, but the approach could be
implemented by any state).
167. KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, at 458.
168. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
169. Bomer, supra note 109, at 430.
170. Miller, supra note 11, at 65.
171. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 67, at 11.
172. See id.
173. Miller, supra note 11, at 67.
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risk which would require the plaintiff to fasten his seat belt.”174 Therefore,
the doctrine of avoidable consequences shifts the focus of the defense from
what caused the accident to the extent of injuries.175 Thus, the seat belt
defense applies to damages, not liability.176
The second argument is conceivably the most important.177 If the seat
belt defense is admitted to show liability under comparative fault, there is a
possibility the plaintiff’s claim could be defeated.178 Courts in contributory
negligence jurisdictions have consistently disallowed the defense because
of its ability to wholly deny a plaintiff’s claim.179 The social policy for
denying the defense in contributory negligence jurisdictions is that the
plaintiff’s conduct of failing to wear a seat belt is not severe enough to
potentially bar his/her recovery.180 Because the possibility for a complete
denial to recovery is conceivable, many jurisdictions adhere to a modified
comparative fault approach.181 Therefore, the same policy arguments that
have unanimously defeated the defense under contributory negligence
would again apply.182
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE APPROACH
There are also arguments in opposition of applying the doctrine of
avoidable consequences to the seat belt defense. The threshold argument
involves the foreseeability of being in an accident.183 Under common law,
a person has a duty to conduct himself/herself in a manner that will not
expose him/her to unreasonable harm.184 Therefore, failing to act as a
“reasonably prudent person” would support the conclusion that a plaintiff
has a common law duty to wear a seat belt.185 This argument is backed by
the now legislatively-imposed duty to wear a seat belt.186
By incorporating the “reasonably prudent person” standard and the
newly adopted comparative negligence theory, scholars contend the
174. Id.
175. See Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168 (N.Y. 1974).
176. See id.
177. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
178. See discussion supra Part II.A.
179. Miller, supra note 11, at 70-71.
180. Id. at 73.
181. Id. at 74; see also discussion supra accompanying notes 35-39 (discussing how
“modified” comparative fault functions).
182. Miller, supra note 11, at 74.
183. See Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 67, at 3 (conjecturing the average American will be
injured in a motor vehicle accident in their lifetime).
184. Dunn v. Durso, 530 A.2d 387, 396 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986).
185. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 67, at 11-12.
186. Bomer, supra note 109, at 428.
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admissibility of the seat belt defense is a logical outcropping.187 “By its
very nature, the concept of comparative negligence contemplates the
inclusion of all relevant factors in arriving at the appropriate amount of
damages to be recovered by each of the claimants.”188 The logical application argument is also supported by the difficulty in bifurcating damages
and liability.189 It would be particularly burdensome when the jury
concludes all or most of the plaintiff’s damages are attributable to his/her
failure to wear a seat belt.190
However, the legal reason most often cited for the doctrine’s rejection
is that the plain and unambiguous definition of the doctrine of avoidable
consequences cannot be practically applied to the seat belt defense.191 The
doctrine of avoidable consequences is a common law rule barring a
plaintiff’s recovery for damages “for any harm that he could have avoided
by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure after the commission of the
tort.”192 Because a person’s failure to fasten his/her seat belt precedes the
accident, the doctrine of avoidable consequences is inapplicable.193
Therefore, the comparative negligence approach is the middle ground
between the theory of contributory negligence and the mitigation of
damages approach.194 Comparative negligence would not bar the plaintiff’s
recovery, but contemplates the plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat belt before
the accident occurs by reducing the damage recovery to the extent the
plaintiff’s injuries were aggravated by such conduct.195
C. PROPOSED APPROACH FOR NORTH DAKOTA
In 2009, 17,673 traffic accidents were reported in North Dakota.196 In
10,238 North Dakota accidents, 1054 involved motorists who were not
wearing their seat belt.197 However, failure to wear an available seat belt
was never cited as the cause of the accident.198 Although a person will

187. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 67, at 14-15.
188. Id. at 14.
189. Westenberg, supra note 22, at 887.
190. Id.
191. Miller, supra note 11, at 70.
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918(1) (1979) (emphasis added).
193. Miller, supra note 11, at 70.
194. See Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 67, at 10.
195. Id.
196. N.D. DEP’T OF TRANSP., N.D. 2009 CRASH SUMMARY 4 (2009), available at http://
www.dot.nd.gov/divisions/safety/docs/crash-summary.pdf.
197. Id. at 55. Data regarding seat belt usage was recorded in 10,238 of the 17,673 traffic
accidents. See id.
198. Id. at 17.
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likely be involved in a car accident at some point, the foreseeability of an
accident should not outweigh the longstanding theory that a “defendant
takes the plaintiff as he finds him.”199
The doctrine of avoidable consequences is the only approach combining the longstanding common law theories with the relative
foreseeability that an accident will occur.200 The opportunity for a plaintiff
to mitigate his/her damages prior to an accident does not ordinarily arise;
however, the use of a seat belt provides “an unusual and ordinarily
unavailable means” to minimize damages before an accident occurs.201
Under the cheapest cost-avoidance theory, the doctrine of avoidable consequences places the burden on the plaintiff to control whether or not he/she
uses a seat belt, but shifts the burden for the cause of the accident to the
tortfeasor.202 North Dakota has already adopted the doctrine of avoidable
consequences in its application of the helmet defense.203 Implementing the
doctrine of avoidable consequences would simply be a matter of legislative
adoption and the creation of a patterned special verdict form.204
The first step would be to amend North Dakota Century Code section
39-21-41.4.205 The adoption of language from New York’s seat belt law
would be the least restrictive means of employing the defense.206 The
North Dakota statute currently reads, in relevant part: “A violation for not
wearing a safety belt under this section is not, in itself, evidence of
negligence.”207 With the addition of language from the current New York
law, a proposed version of the statute would read as follows: a violation for
not wearing a safety belt under the section would “not be admissible as

199. See Westenberg, supra note 22, at 871 n.12 (explaining the maxim means, for example,
“if the defendant is liable for disabling a high wage earner, he will pay more in damages . . . than
if liable for injuring someone who is unemployed”).
200. See discussion supra accompanying notes 174-75.
201. Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168 (N.Y. 1974).
202. Gallub, supra note 57, at 322-23. The cheapest cost-avoidance is an economic analysis
which places “the party best situated to avoid injuries at the lowest cost.” SHAPO, supra note 21,
at 8. Based on data from 2006 to 2009, seat belt use in North Dakota is reported as “56.1%
effective in preventing injuries and 50.7% effective in preventing fatalities.” N.D. STATE UNIV.,
MEDICAL AND ECONOMIC COST OF NORTH DAKOTA MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES 10 (May 2010),
available at http://www.ugpti.org/pubs/pdf/DP225.pdf.
203. See Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 N.W.2d 118, 123 (N.D. 1983) (permitting a plaintiff’s
failure to wear a helmet to be considered in mitigating damages).
204. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1229-c (Consol. 1992 & Supp. 2011); Ins. Co. of
N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 454 (Fla. 1984) (holding the mitigation of damages
approach with the addition of specific interrogatories to the typical verdict form was an equitable
approach to the seat belt defense).
205. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-21-41.4 (2008) (requiring the use of seat belts in North Dakota).
206. See discussion supra Part III.B.2 (explaining New York allows evidence of seat belt
nonuse to reduce the plaintiff’s damages up to any percent).
207. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-21-41.4.
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evidence in any civil action in a court of law in regard to the issue of
liability but may be introduced into evidence in mitigation of damages
provided the party introducing said evidence has pleaded such noncompliance as an affirmative defense.”208
Because of the defense’s complexity, it may be difficult for a jury to
adequately apply or understand how to apply the mitigation of damages
approach.209 To avoid confusion, a verdict form that clearly distinguishes
between accident-causing fault and injury-enhancing fault should be
utilized.210 Therefore, the following interrogatories would be an appropriate addition to a special verdict form where the seat belt defense is an
affirmative defense:211
(a) Did defendant prove that the plaintiff failed to use reasonable
care under the circumstances by failing to use an available and
fully operational seat belt?
_____Yes_____No
If your answer to question (a) is No, you should not proceed
further except to date and sign this verdict form and return it to the
courtroom. If your answer to question (a) is Yes, please answer
question (b).
(b) Did defendant prove that plaintiff’s failure to use an available
and fully operational seat belt produced or contributed
substantially to producing at least a portion of the plaintiff’s
damages?
_____Yes_____No
If your answer to question (b) is No, you should not proceed
further except to date and sign this verdict form and return it to the
courtroom. If your answer to question (b) is Yes, please answer
question (c).

208. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAWS § 1229-c(8); see also Bomer, supra note 109, at 431
(suggesting each state’s legislature should enact the mitigation of damages approach for the seat
belt defense).
209. See Westenberg, supra note 22, at 887 (discussing how the issues of damages and
liability may merge for juries to consider).
210. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 454 (Fla. 1984).
211. The following jury instructions are more likely to be used if the defense has proven,
through expert testimony, a causal relationship between the plaintiff’s injuries and his/her failure
to wear a seatbelt. See Westenberg, supra note 22, at 896-98.
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(c) What percentage of plaintiff’s total damages were caused by
his (or her) failure to use an available and fully operational seat
belt?
_____%212
The additional interrogatories should follow the traditional interrogatories with regard to the relative contribution of fault for causing the
accident.213 The multi-step special verdict form allows the jury to first
attribute each party’s fault for purposes of comparative negligence.214
Secondly, it allows the jury to further reduce the plaintiff’s damage
recovery by his/her failure to mitigate his/her damages.215 The two-step
application is a “rational approach” to a complicated and real problem.216
V. CONCLUSION
“The seat belt defense has had a short but glamorous career.”217
Although it has only been in effect for less than four decades, it has
managed to stir controversy and create divisions throughout the United
States.218 With such varying opinions, the defense has not yet received
universal acceptance, judicially or legislatively, but the clear trend is
towards acceptance.219 Being that North Dakota has an unsettled and
ambiguous past with the seat belt defense,220 it is time for a change.
Particularly, it is time North Dakota legislatively adopt the mitigation of
damages approach for the seat belt defense.221 The doctrine of avoidable
consequences would create an equitable balance to the seat belt defense that
is most appropriate for North Dakota.222
Lindsay M. Harris*

212. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 454.
213. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 67, at 19.
214. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 454.
215. Id.
216. Bomer, supra note 109, at 431.
217. Miller, supra note 11, at 65.
218. See Bomer, supra note 109, at 424 (noting jurisdictions take several different
approaches).
219. Westenberg, supra note 22, at 904.
220. Id. at 887 n.114.
221. See supra discussion Part IV.C (discussing an approach to adopting the mitigation of
damages approach to the seat belt defense).
222. Bomer, supra note 109, at 431.
*2012 J.D. candidate at the University of North Dakota School of Law. A special thank you to
my family for their constant love, support, patience, and encouragement.
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APPENDIX A
Alabama

Inadmissible223

Britton v. Doehring, 242 So. 2d 666,
671 (Ala. 1970)

Alaska

Mitigation of
damages

Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194,
1199 (Alaska 1986)

Arizona

Comparative fault

Law v. Superior Court, 755 P.2d 1135,
1145 (Ariz. 1988)

Arkansas

Inadmissible

ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-37-703 (2008)

California

Comparative fault

CAL. VEH. CODE § 27315(i)
(Deering Supp. 2011)

Colorado

Mitigation of
damages for pain
and suffering only

COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-237(7)
(2009)

Connecticut

Inadmissible

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-100a(3)
(West 2006)

Delaware

Inadmissible

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4802(i)
(2005)

District of
Columbia

Inadmissible

D.C. CODE § 50-1807 (LexisNexis
2007)

Florida

Comparative fault

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.614(10)
(West 2006)

Georgia

Inadmissible

GA. CODE ANN. § 40-8-76.1(d)
(2007 & Supp. 2010)

Hawaii

Unsettled224

Idaho

Inadmissible

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-673(8) (2008)

Illinois

Inadmissible

625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12603.1(c) (West 2008 & Supp. 2011)

223. “Inadmissible” for purposes of this appendix is strictly limited to the seat belt defense’s
admissibility for traditional comparative or contributory negligence. In some cases, it may be
admissible in products liability cases, better known as “crashworthiness” cases.
224. “Unsettled” indicates the legislature has not adopted an affirmative approach and the
defense has not been expounded upon by the judiciary.

2011]

NOTE

163

Indiana

Inadmissible

State v. Ingram, 427 N.E.2d 444, 448
(Ind. 1981)

Iowa

Mitigation of
damages up to five
percent

IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445(4)
(West 1997 & Supp. 2011)

Kansas

Inadmissible

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2504(c)
(2001 & Supp. 2010)

Kentucky

Comparative fault

Louisiana

Inadmissible

Wemyss v. Coleman, 729 S.W.2d 174,
179
(Ky. 1987)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:295.1(F)
(2002 & Supp. 2011)

Maine

Inadmissible

ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29-A, § 2081(5)
(Supp. 2010)

Maryland

Inadmissible

MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 22412.3(h) (LexisNexis 2009)

Massachusetts

Unsettled

Michigan

Comparative fault
up to five percent

MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §
257.710e(7) (LexisNexis 2010)

Minnesota

Inadmissible

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.685(4)
(West Supp. 2011)

Mississippi

Inadmissible

MISS. CODE ANN. § 62-2-3 (2004)

Missouri

Mitigation of
damages up to one
percent

MO. ANN. STAT. § 307.178(4)
(West 2009)

Montana

Inadmissible

MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-13-106 (2009)

Nebraska

Mitigation of
damages up to five
percent

NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-6,273 (2004)

Nevada

Inadmissible

Jeep Corp. v. Murray, 708 P.2d 297,
301 (Nev. 1985)

New Hampshire

Inadmissible

Thibeault v. Campbell, 622 A.2d 212,
214 (N.H. 1993)
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New Jersey

Comparative fault

Dunn v. Durso, 530 A.2d 387, 397
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986)

New Mexico

Inadmissible

N.M. STAT. § 66-7-373
(LexisNexis Supp. 2003)

New York

Mitigation of
damages

N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1229-c(8)
(Consol. 1992)

North Carolina

Inadmissible

North Dakota

Comparative fault

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-135.2A(d)
(2009)
Day v. Gen. Motors Corp., 345
N.W.2d 349, 357 (N.D. 1984)

Ohio

Mitigation of
damages for
noneconomic loss

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4513.263(F)
(LexisNexis 2008)

Oklahoma

Admissible225

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 12-420
(West Supp. 2011)

Oregon

Mitigation of
damages up to five
percent

OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.760
(West Supp. 2011)

Pennsylvania

Inadmissible

Rhode Island

Inadmissible

75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4581(e) (West
2006)
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 32-22-22 (2002)

South Carolina

Inadmissible

S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-6540(c)
(Supp. 2010)

South Dakota

Inadmissible

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-38-4 (2004)

Tennessee

Mitigation of
damages

TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-9-604 (2008);
Grandstaff v. Hawks, 36 S.W.3d 482,
492 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)

Texas

Unsettled226

Utah

Inadmissible

UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-1806
(LexisNexis 2010)

225. Effective November 1, 2009, Oklahoma’s legislature changed the seat belt defense from
not allowing evidence of seat belt use to allowing evidence of seat belt nonuse. H.R. 1603, 52d
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009).
226. Texas Transportation Code section 545.413(g), which rendered evidence of seat belt
nonuse inadmissible, was repealed in 2003. H.R. 4, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003).
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Vermont

Inadmissible

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1259(d)
(2007)
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1094(D)
(2005)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
46.61.688(6)
(West 1987)
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-15-49(d)
(LexisNexis 2009)

Virginia

Inadmissible

Washington

Inadmissible

West Virginia

Inadmissible

Wisconsin

Mitigation of
damages up to
fifteen percent

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 347.48(2m)(g)
(West 2005 & Supp. 2010)

Wyoming

Inadmissible

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-1402(f)
(2011)
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